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RIGHTS THAT "INHERE IN THE TITLE
ITSELF": THE IMPACT OF THE LUCAS
CASE ON WESTERN WATER LAW
Joseph L. Sax*
Commentary on the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council I has focused overwhelmingly on the so-called nuisance excep-
tion: Where regulation entirely devalues property, compensation must
be paid unless the regulation does "no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the ourts ... under the State's law of pri-
vate nuisance."2 This rule is viewed as potentially very favorable to
property owners and very unfavorable to government regulation. The
reason is that most controversy over asserted regulatory takings involves
conduct that was not previously viewed as a nuisance. The Lucas deci-
sion seems to characterize a conservative Supreme Court ready to rein in
state and local governments that appear ready to sacrifice established
property rights to the public agenda of the day.
Another aspect of Lucas, however, has received little attention-the
Court's view of the rights that inhere in a property owner's title. Dis-
cussing regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land,
the Court wrote: "Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership." 3 The Court then went on
to speak only of nuisance (as have most commentators):
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that
affect the public generally .... '
* James H. House and Hiram H. Hurd Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California, Berkeley; A.B., 1957, Harvard College; J.D., 1959, University of Chicago.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Id. at 2900.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Perhaps little attention has been paid to the property half of the Court's
"property and nuisance" formulation because it seems self-evident. One
cannot claim that property was taken away if one did not have property
to begin with. The very first issue in a "takings" case, to use the Court's
own words, is for owners to identify those interests that "were... part of
[their] title to begin with,"' those things included in "the 'bundle of
rights' that they acquire[d] when they obtain[ed] title."6
The Court in Lucas adopted a definitional/historical, rather than a
functional, view of property.7 This characterization of property rights
may very well lead in a direction the Lucas Court did not intend to go.
Simply stated, the Lucas rule says that government's right to constrain
the use of property without paying compensation is limited by what it
withheld from owners at the outset. Government cannot change the
rules of the game after the game has started. To find the rules articulated
when the game began, one is directed to historical definition.8
In the nuisance category, the Court's view is destined to lead to
more compensation. The reason is that relatively few things were tradi-
tionally categorized as nuisances because there was relatively little gov-
ernmental regulation of land.9 Property in water, however, is quite a
different situation. Definitionally, property rights in water have been de-
lineated in very limited terms. Water has been described as merely usu-
fructuary; as belonging to the public; as subject to public servitudes; as
incapable of full ownership; as subject to constraints that it be used
nonwastefully, reasonably, beneficially, etc. 10
The Lucas Court seems to have forsaken familiar notions of reason-
able expectations as a measure of property rights in favor of what Justice
5. Id. at 2899.
6. Id.
7. This is in part what Professor Thompson calls a dispositive, rather than a normative,
view of property. Law is what the state says it is, rather than what in some sense it "ought" to
be, or what it actually is, as measured in the marketplace. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1523 (1990). As noted below, even if the Court has
articulated normative standards (protecting settled expectations), it appears to subordinate
such norms to a clearly articulated definition. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469 (1988) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 34-50); Bowen v. Public Agencies
Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488
(1973).
8. One of the ambiguities in the Lucas opinion is that it refers to some not very clear past
time, such as the time of "title to begin with." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
9. There was, however, considerable regulation of the economy when mercantilism still
held sway. See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORI-
GINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10-36 (1985).
10. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990).
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Scalia calls a "categorical" rule; in this instance a rule drawn from a
historical definition that is quite different from a rule of expectation. Ex-
pectational rules are based on experience rather than definition. Whether
and to what extent the Court is leaving behind ordinary expectational
notions remains to be seen. Justice Scalia referred to expectations only
twice, I1 neither time to state the basic ruling of the case, and each time in
a rather ambiguous way. Once, he invoked expectations to distinguish
expectations about personal property from those about real property.
Elsewhere he spoke of "the property" against which measures of diminu-
tion must be made in terms of "expectations shaped by the State's law of
property." 2 But that is only to say that the expectations the law recog-
nizes are those created by the definition of the property at issue. The
Court probably assumed that its definitional rule will usually be congru-
ent with marketplace expectations. But it does not choose to let expecta-
tions in the market shape its rule. Why? I suggest the following
explanation.
The tone and rhetoric of Lucas seems deliberately calculated to cut
off arguments that changing times create changing needs, and with them
changing (diminished) expectations that property owners must internal-
ize. Indeed the question, how responsive must property owners be to
changing public goals and values, is the central point of dispute between
the majority and the dissent in Lucas. Justice Stevens's dissent said:
"The human condition is one of constant learning and evolution ....
Legislatures . . . must often revise the definition of property and the
rights of property owners." 13 As contrasted with such a view, the major-
ity opinion in Lucas was all about definitional fixity of rights, and notions
of security that arise from such fixity. Definitional/historical standards
usually leave the least room to argue that owners should have anticipated
change and provide the strongest claims that the public should compen-
sate those who are the casualties of a changing world.
Paradoxicafly, the majority's rejection of evolution, change and con-
temporary expectations is calculated to work against the owners of water
rights. Such owners-opposing new regulatory schemes like those
designed to restore instream fishery or recreational values-might have
argued that traditional definitional limits on water rights had been dis-
placed in practice by rules that tolerated waste, permitted total dewater-
ing of streams, encouraged destruction of wetlands, and so forth. All
that is true, and it has no doubt shaped the expectations of water users.
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7, 2899 (describing risks of which owners should be aware).
12. Id. at 2894 n.7.
13. Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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But if the question is what their "title to begin with" was, rather than
what practice long permitted, such arguments are unlikely to carry much
weight.
Lucas was not the first case in which the Supreme Court has been
guided by formal property definitions. In a variety of contexts the Court
has asserted the view that the only property rights one has are those that
have been formally granted, and that limitations on clearly defined prop-
erty rights will be respected even though practice has long been at odds
with them.
In United States v. Fuller 14 the Court held that a compensable prop-
erty interest was not involuntarily created when government makes clear
in a statute that it does not intend to create a property right. Fuller
involved a permit to graze livestock on federal land."5 Such permits are
granted to ranchers, and though they are revocable, they are hardly ever
revoked. As a result they become very valuable and add considerably to
the worth of nearby private ranches owned by permit holders. Fuller
raised a claim that the value of a federal grazing permit must be compen-
sated when it is lost through condemnation of a permit holder's nearby
private land.16 The fact that the grazing permit in fact had many of the
indicia of property-that it was subject to exclusive possession and use,
bought, sold, traded and mortgaged in the market-carried no weight
with the Court. The statute authorizing the grant of such permits was
unmistakable in its intent. It said: "[T]he issuance of a permit pursuant
to the provisions of this subchapter shall not create any right, title, inter-
est, or estate in or to the lands." 7 Congress did not intend to create a
property right; it said so explicitly; and therefore it did not create such a
right. "Government ... may not be required to compensate... for
elements of value that the Government has created."
' 18
14. 409 U.S. 488 (1973). The personnel of the Court has changed so much in recent years
that conclusions drawn from earlier cases often seem in doubt today. It is notable, however,
that the Fuller majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist, joined by then Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun. Justice Powell dissented, and his dissent
was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. None of the dissenters are still on the
Court, while three members of the majority are still sitting Justices.
15. d at 489.
16. Id.
17. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1988).
18. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 492. Fuller involved a claim to use the public domain, and the
Court seems to have been especially troubled by the assertion that Congress could lose control
of its own property despite its unmistakable intention not to do so. The precedent the case sets
does not appear to be limited to government-owned property, however. Though the question
of valuation in the setting of condemnation generated a dissent in Fuller, all nine Justices
seemed in accord that no compensation would have been required if the government had sim-
ply exercised its expressly reserved authority to revoke the permits, despite the economic loss
[Vol. 26:943
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The Court has made clear elsewhere that property rights do not
arise simply because expectations are formed, even if those expectations
grow out of governmental action.' 9 Thus in one celebrated case, Reichel-
derfer v. Quinn,20 the government had established a park across the street
from a private home. Proximity to the park increased the home's value.
Later the government ceased to use the land across from the home as a
park and built a fire station on the site. The result was to devalue the
home. The Court held that no property interest had been created by the
establishment of the park, and no compensation was due when the use of
the land was changed. The Court stated: "Existence of value alone does
not generate interests protected by the Constitution against diminution
by the Government."'" In that case the law establishing the park had
said the land was "perpetually dedicated and set apart as a park,"22 but
the Court said even such language is not to be taken as creating private
property rights.23 "Statutes said to restrict the power of government by
the creation of private rights are . . . to be strictly construed for the
protection of the public interest."24 "For if the enjoyment of a benefit
thus derived from the public acts of government were a source of legal
rights to have it perpetuated, the powers of government would be ex-
hausted by their exercise," 2 and government would have constrained its
freedom to legislate or regulate in the public interest in the future.26
that would thereby have been inflicted on the permittees. Id. at 497 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The dissenting Justices were troubled by the fact that the market value of a condemned tract of
land often includes values that are not the owners' property, such as proximity to a park or
proximity to a public highway. Id at 502-03 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19. The only possible exceptions are if the government has created a debt it owes, or an
obligation to provide benefits under a contract for which the obligee paid a monetary premium
to the government; that is, circumstances in which the government's own economic interests
are at issue. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
55 (1986). There is some dicta to the contrary in state law, but it is inapposite. See, for
example, County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491
(1975), in which the court stated: "Mhe right to compensation is to be determined by
whether the condemnation has deprived the claimant of a valuable right rather than by
whether.., his right can technically be called an 'estate' or 'interest' in land." Id. at 690-91,
532 P.2d at 143, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 495. But that case involved exclusively a dispute among
private parties, about how a compensation award was to be shared among various private
parties.
20. 287 U.S. 315 (1932).
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. at 317.
23. Id. at 318.
24. Id. at 321.
25. Id. at 319.
26. As noted in the discussion of the Bowen case, the Court has expressed the same con-
cern whether the property right is a claim for compensation or for injunctive relief. See infra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text. The no compensation rule also supports the federal gov-
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Recently the Court reaffirmed its view that property rights cannot
arise against reserved governmental regulatory power that inheres in an
original definition of property, even if the circumstances seem quite sym-
pathetic. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrap-
ment 27 was decided by a unanimous Court. In that case the United
States had entered into an agreement with various states providing that,
upon two years notice, a state could withdraw from the social security
system for state and local government employees.2" Subsequently a fed-
eral law was enacted prohibiting such withdrawals.29 The Court sus-
tained the validity of the later-enacted statute, which withdrew the
contractually created opportunity to withdraw, rejecting the state claim
that it had a contractually created property right.3"
A crucial fact for the Court was that the statute authorizing volun-
tary state participation in social security and authorizing agreements to
set the terms of state participation contained a provision that expressly
reserved: "[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision ' 31 of the
statute. Because Congress retained the right to amend the statute, and
thus to alter the terms on which participation in the program could be
terminated, the Court determined that a contract implementing the stat-
ute could not be interpreted to create a property right at odds with the
right of amendment retained in the statute.
The Court's reluctance to recognize the creation of property rights
by implication is founded in a concern-like that in the park case dis-
cussed above-that the existence of such rights would constrain the sov-
ereign in exercising governmental authority to achieve important public
purposes.32 Arrangements said to create property rights "should be con-
strued, if possible, to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority.
'33
emiment's navigation servitude, where definitionally no private property exists, but an interest
in land adjacent to the navigable water might have a very high market value. See, e.g., United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
27. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 50-51.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988).
32. The concern extended not only to a fear that a public program would be enjoined, but
that it would be deterred if compensation had to be paid as a price for implementing the
program. The complaint in Bowen included a claim for taking property without payment of
just compensation, as well as for injunctive relief. Bowen, 477 U.S. at 50 n.16. The Court
made no distinction between damages and injunctive relief in its ruling. See id. at 51.
33. Id. at 52. See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 282 (1933) ("This Court has had frequent occasion to observe that the power of Congress
in the regulation of interstate commerce is not fettered by the necessity of maintaining existing
arrangements which would conflict with the execution of its policy.... ."). The same concern
[Vol. 26:943
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Cases like Fuller and Bowen show the Court taking a strong defini-
tional posture in deciding whether a private property right existed. But
those were both cases in which the government had been more or less
explicit about not wanting to create private rights (however much the
market may have treated the interests as property). What of the more
common case in which intent is less clear; in which definitions (perhaps
very old ones) are in tension with longstanding governmental behavior
and expectations to which that behavior gives rise; and in which govern-
ment, perhaps to implement some modem policy, seeks to rely on its old
definitions to insulate itself against a takings claim?
At least one contemporary illustrative case exists, the 1988 decision
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.3 4 Phillips involved the ownership
of land beneath non-navigable tidal waters.35 The Court split five-to-
three on the question of whether such lands passed into state ownership
as public trust lands upon the state's admission to the Union.36 The ma-
jority held that the lands did pass into state ownership.37 The interesting
question-from the perspective of Lucas-was how to analyze the subse-
quent status of those lands. The facts were that Phillips and its predeces-
sors had been the record owner, and had paid taxes, on the tract in
question for more than a century.3" Record title is not a decisive fact for
private claimants because conveyances of public trust lands are deemed
to be subject to trust rights. The question was whether Mississippi ulti-
mately held or implicitly relinquished its rights in lands under non-navi-
gable waters, such as these.3 9 Does one look to old definitions in state
law? to the state's actual behavior over many years? to expectations re-
vealed by private transactions?
The majority opinion in Phillips is by no means perfectly clear, but
it seems to exalt definitional statements of property rights over behavior
or expectational claims. Phillips and those who supported it as amici
urged the Court to interpret Mississippi law in terms of the expectations
and interests that had developed over more than a century during which
Phillips paid taxes on the land, appeared to have fee simple title, and
has led the Court to reject retroactivity claims against new regulatory standards applied to pre-
existing programs. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992) (holding that
statute retroactively imposing liability for additional worker's compensation benefits for closed
disability period does not violate due process or impairment of contracts clauses of U.S.
Constitution).
34. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
35. Id. at 472.
36. Id. at 471.
37. Id. at 484.
38. Id. at 482.
39. Id. at 472.
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during which Mississippi was said to have shown no interest in the dis-
puted land for public trust purposes such as fishing.' Mississippi
evinced no interest in these lands until 1973 when, in the interest of pro-
tecting wetlands, it authorized a mapping project to show state-owned
wetlands.4 1 With the maps in hand showing the disputed lands as state-
owned, Mississippi proceeded to lease the lands to a private company,
Saga Petroleum, for oil and gas development. 2 Phillips then brought
suit to quiet title, asserting its record ownership and tax history.43
The majority's disposition of Phillips's expectation claim is interest-
ing. "We have recognized the importance of honoring reasonable expec-
tations of property interests,"'  the Court stated. But, it continued,
"such expectations can only be of consequence where they are 'reason-
able' ones."' 45 Mississippi law had consistently said that the state held a
public trust title in all lands under the tidewater. 4' The Court concluded,
therefore, that "any contrary expectations cannot be considered reason-
able."'47 That is, an expectation however real, functionally speaking, can-
not be considered reasonable if it is at odds with a definition of
property.48 In addition, because state law prohibits acquisition of prop-
erty against the state by adverse possession, laches or other equitable
doctrines,4 9 paying taxes and holding record title could not operate to
transfer title to Phillips.
The opinion in Phillips invites the conclusion that definitions of
property are of primary, if not determinative, importance, notwithstand-
ing their non-enforcement for many years, and notwithstanding govern-
ment behavior to suggest that the law is different from its formal
statement.5' The implications of such a rule for western water law in
40. Id. at 481-82.
41. Id. at 492 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 472, 482.
44. Id. at 482.
45. Id.
46. Mississippi law had never actually dealt with a case involving non-navigable lands, and
the state had apparently never actually acted as the owner against deed holders of non-naviga-
ble tidelands, like Phillips. Id.
47. Id.
48. I referred to this determination earlier when I stated that the Court was subordinating
expectations to definitions.
49. Phillips, 484 U.S. at 484.
50. The majority's conclusion that its decision will "do no more than confirm the prevail-
ing understanding," id. at 482-83, appears to be directed to its federal ruling that the state
originally obtained title to non-navigable tidal waters, and is free to hold title or to relinquish
it. The Court does not appear to suggest that Phillips's expectations, or those of others in its
[V:ol. 26:943
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states which now stand ready to implement long-moribund precepts of
waste and beneficial use, or the public trust, are obvious.
How far the present Court is willing to follow a categorical/defini-
tional approach, as opposed to an equitable/expectational one, remains
uncertain. Interestingly, Justice Scalia, who authored Lucas, joined Jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent, which expressed great unhappiness at what was
viewed as inequitable treatment of Phillips. The dissent was not written
on expectational grounds. Rather, it interpreted federal public trust law
differently. The dissent never hinted at constitutionally nullifying Missis-
sippi's implementation of its own law, though it expressed dismay at the
result its interpretations created for "innocent property owners."51
Owners of water rights ought to be especially uneasy. Under the
Lucas/Phillips approach, property rights in water are not only restric-
tively defined, but the definitions openly anticipate changes that may di-
minish or abolish uses that were once permitted. For example, the
requirement that uses be reasonable and beneficial, and not wasteful, is
central to water law doctrine. In a leading California case in 1935, the
California Supreme Court noted: "What is a beneficial use at one time
may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later
time."52 This very point was made by Special Master Simon H. Rifkind
in his report to the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Califor-
nia,53 speaking of the Imperial Valley:
The supply of available water.., has in the past been substan-
tially larger than the demand for it .... In such circumstances
it is not surprising that a great deal of water has been wasted, as
is apparent, for example, from the very large unused runoff
each year into the Salton Sea. Undoubtedly when and if water
becomes scarce in this area, its use will be regulated much more
efficiently than at present. 4
position, are not disappointed, though it does imply that not many claimants are in Phillips's
position.
51. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (1935)
(quoted in People ex reL State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743,
750, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1976)); see also In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 522 (Or. 1914)
("[C]rude and wasteful manner of irrigating must be replaced by modem, economical methods
... ."); N. DAK. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.3 (1985) (setting forth priority system for water
rights).
53. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
54. H.R. REP. No. 780, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1988) (recommending passage of S. Res.
795, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)).
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This is a standard definition for water rights of what the Court in Lucas
described as "the bundle of rights that [appropriators] acquire when they
obtain title to property""5 in water rights.
A parallel definition applies to the rights one obtains in waters sub-
ject to the public trust. A 1928 decision of the California Supreme
Court, Boone v. Kingsbury,56 is illustrative. Despite the objection of cer-
tain parties concerned about protecting the state's waters, the State is-
sued an offshore oil and gas lease to a private company. 7 The court
rejected assertions that state waters could not be leased at all.5 8 But,
focusing on the limited nature of the rights that leaseholders could obtain
in public waters, the court stated:
Nor is there any substantial cause of alarm lest the twelve hun-
dred miles of our sea coast will be barricaded by "a forest of oil
derricks," which will interfere with commerce or navigation.
The state may at any time remove structures from the ocean
erected by its citizens, even though they have been erected with
its license or consent, if it subsequently determines them to be
purprestures or finds that they substantially interfere with navi-
gation or commerce.5 9
The California Supreme Court cited Boone as authority when it de-
cided National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,' the Mono Lake case,
fifty-five years later. In that case, the court held that the state bears a
continuing duty of supervision over appropriators of the state's waters in
order to protect the public trust.6 ' To implement that duty the state may
require even long-standing appropriators to leave water in situ in order to
maintain the integrity of natural systems. This, of course, is precisely the
sort of regulation the United States Supreme Court found so objectiona-
ble in Lucas. But in the NationalAudubon case, restrictions imposed on
the property owner were arguably consistent with the limitations on its
"title to begin with," and thus not a taking of anything the owner defini-
tionally-if not functionally-had.
In light of Lucas, the question most likely to be raised today in the
context of western water law is how the United States Supreme Court
would treat a case like National Audubon. If, as seems to be the case, the
55. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
56. 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928).
57. Id. at 193, 273 P. at 816-17.
58. Id. at 191, 273 P. at 816.
59. Id. at 192-93, 273 P. at 816.
60. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
61. Id at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
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Court will look to state property law definitions for guidance, it might
first look to Boone. That decision seems to offer little comfort to owners
of water rights. But the relevant time for determining the definition of
property rights can be very uncertain, as California public trust law illus-
trates. Boone was not decided until 1928. It is not at all clear what
public trust law was, in regard to owners of rights in water, prior to 1928.
When property is defined by common-law litigation, many issues of own-
ership remain unlitigated. Moreover, Boone did not deal with environ-
mental interests beyond navigation and commerce. Application of the
public trust to ecological values was not articulated until 1971, when the
California Supreme Court decided Marks v. Whitney.62 Nor did Boone
deal with non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. That issue only
arose in 1983 when the Court decided National Audubon. On the other
hand, prior to 1913, California public trust law may have been even more
protective of public rights than it is now. Until the California Supreme
Court decided People v. California Fish Co. ,63 it was still being argued
that public trust land could not under any circumstances be alienated to
the exclusion of the public.
If and when the question arises, what will the United States
Supreme Court hold the definition of water rights, as "part of... title to
begin with," 6 in California is? No one can say with confidence. Will it
say that California has changed the law and has transgressed the" 'back-
ground principles' of its own property law"?65 Or will it say that Califor-
nia has simply been articulating, in the common-law manner, what was
always its law of beneficial use-that the scope of private rights changes
in response to changing circumstances? The search for a historical defi-
62. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). It is worth noting that in
Phillips, the United States Supreme Court referred to a 1967 Mississippi decision for authority
that Mississippi public trust law was not limited to protecting navigation, as against a private
party property title that went back 150 years. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S.
469, 482 (1988) (citing Trouting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (Miss.
1967)).
63. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
64. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992).
65. Ordinarily the Court looks to state law to determine whether a property right has been
created, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), with limited federal court scru-
tiny to assure that state law definitions do not in themselves violate federal constitutional pro-
tections. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
United States Supreme Court has on several occasions suggested that a "sudden change in the
law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents, would be an unconstitutional taking."
Id. at 296-97 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164 (1980). In Sotomura v. County of Haw., 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978), the
court held that the Hawaii court violated the Takings Clause by radically departing from prior
state law. Id at 482-83. The Hawaii Supreme Court had held that the vegetation line, rather
than the line of mean high tide, was the seaward boundary of private property. Id.
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nition of property rights, especially those established through common-
law adjudication, is problematic at best. Time alone will tell how the
Court will administer its definitional/historical view of property rights.
But at least this much can be said: As far as owners of western water
rights are concerned, the Lucas decision is no obvious occasion for
celebration.
